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October 2011 marked the 25th Anniversary of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which was celebrated for its
"significant role in protecting human health and the environment over the last
quarter century by providing communities and emergency planners with valuable
information on toxic chemical releases in their area." I This Note aims to
evaluate the effectiveness of three important provisions of the statute-the
Toxics Release Inventory, the emergency planning mandate, and the citizen suit
provision-through a case study of their implementation in Institute, West
Virginia, the site of an industrial accident that prompted the enactment of
EPCRA in 1986. This Note argues that although EPCRA made significant
improvements to industry transparency in terms of its production and release of
hazardous substances, there remain significant barriers concerning adequate
resources, informational tools, and enforcement measures. These challenges must
be addressed to ensure that citizens are provided with equitable opportunities to
inform and ultimately protect their communities from health and environmental
hazards. Through interviews with Institute residents and members of a local
community advocacy group, along with analyses of the current informational
tools available to the public under the statute, the Note will discuss specific
challenges facing industrial communities, and offer a series of practical and legal
solutions to increase the effectiveness of the statute, particularly in the most
economically and politically vulnerable communities.
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 2012; Ph.D. Student, Duke University. The author is indebted to
Maya Nye, Sue Davis, Donna Willis, Pam Nixon, Wame Ferguson, and Gus Nelson for their
invaluable contributions throughout this project and their hospitality in Institute, West Virginia.
Special thanks to Dean Martha Minow, Dr. Deborah Rigling Gallagher, and the staff of the Yale
Journal of Health Law, Policy, and Ethics for their helpful comments and criticisms.
I Emergency Mgmt., 25 Years of EPCRA, U.S. Envt'l Protection Agency (EPA),
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/epcra/epcra25.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2011).
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INTRODUCTION: OUT OF DISASTER, A NEW EMERGENCY PLANNING REGIME
On August 11, 1985, a Union Carbide chemical manufacturing facility
released mass quantities of methylene chloride and aldicarb oxime in the town of
Institute, West Virginia, injuring six plant workers and sending 135 residents to
area hospitals.2 The incident occurred less than one year after Union Carbide's
sister plant in Bhopal, India leaked several tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC),
killing more than 3,800 people, and causing an estimated 15,000-20,000
premature deaths from exposure over a twenty-year period.3 In response to these
two incidents,4 public protests around industrial accountability, and the specter of
a Bhopal-like disaster in the U.S., Congress passed the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), which aimed to "help
communities plan for emergencies involving hazardous substances" by creating
requirements for local emergency plans, and community right-to-know laws to
ensure that residents are provided with information on chemicals produced and
emitted from local facilities. 6
EPCRA is unconventional in that its objective is not the classic "command
and control" of environmental impacts that characterize many environmental
statutes from the 1970s like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.7 The Act
has four main goals. It sets requirements for: (1) emergency planning at the state
and local levels, (2) emergency emissions notifications, (3) reports on the storage
and transportation of threshold quantities of hazardous chemicals; and (4) yearly
reports of toxic releases of listed chemicals above threshold levels.8 Beyond
these requirements, industries have no express obligations under the statute to
mitigate releases or to reduce risks to their employees and their surrounding
2 See Robert Abrams & Douglas H. Ward, Prospects for Safer Communities: Emergency
Response, Community Right To Know, and Prevention of Chemical Accidents, 14 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 135, 143 (1990).
3 Edward Broughton, The Bhopal Disaster and its Aftermath: A Review, 4 ENVTL. HEALTH 1, 2
(2005).
4 Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, The Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, EPA (Sept. 2012), http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/epcra.pdf.
5 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11011-11050 (2006)).
6 Emergency Mgmt., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act Requirements,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/epcra (last updated Mar. 28, 2013).
7 Many environmental statutes (e.g., Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act) are characterized as
"command and control," which means that regulated entities are required to comply with specific
"ambient standards, source-specific emission limits, or technology requirements." Nat'l Ctr. for
Envtl. Econ., Economic Incentives for Pollution Control: Command and Control, EPA,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/EconomiclncentivesPollutionControl.html (search
"Command and control" in NCEE Custom Search box) (last updated April 14, 2013). EPCRA
imposes no such standards or controls on regulated industries, regardless of the level of reported
emissions. It simply compels the disclosure of information on those emissions.
8 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11023 (2006).
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communities.9 Nevertheless, as detailed below, this "toothless" statute has been
instrumental not only in improvements in industry transparency to its neighbors
and the larger public. Also, and perhaps unexpectedly, in increased self-policing
by many industries of their emissions, both to appease investment stakeholders
and to prevent costly waste from inefficiencies at their facilities."o
It is now widely accepted that there is a fundamental link between public
health risks and the condition of the physical environment. Genetic factors
undoubtedly play a role in the development of chronic disease, but "70 to 90% of
disease risks are probably due to differences in environments."" Environmental
exposures to air and water toxics, occupational hazards, and behavioral patterns,
such as dietary choices and stress levels, effectively alter the physiology of the
body. This creates an "internal chemical environment" more or less conducive to
the development of chronic diseases12 such as heart disease, cancer, and lower
respiratory diseases, the top three causes of death in Americans.' 3 EPCRA yields
information that can be critical in assessing the relationship between
environmental health and public health. It also highlights the impact of
environmental burdens, such as chemical production facilities, on the health and
quality of life of the nation's fenceline communities, many of which are
segregated along race and class lines and politically marginalized.
A 2008-2009 report by the President's Cancer Panel identified three key
challenges to mitigating environmental cancer risks: "limited research on
environmental influences on cancer; conflicting or inadequate exposure
measurement, assessment, and classification; and ineffective regulation of
environmental chemical and other hazardous exposures."14 Considering these
obstacles, EPCRA's industrial emissions data, particularly from the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI), can be an indispensable and invaluable resource in
research on the linkages between toxics and exposures and risks of cancer and
other chronic diseases.
9 Id.
10 See JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND
IMPACTS OF THE ToxIcs RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 80 (2005) ("Citizen group and industry
respondents often agreed on the overall impacts of TRI data use. More than half the respondents in
each of the categories agreed that the release of the TRI led to source reduction efforts at reporting
plants, media coverage of the toxic releases, and the prompting of industry-citizen meetings.").
II Stephen M. Rappaport & Martyn T. Smith, Environment and Disease Risks, 330 SCIENCE
460 (1990).
12 Id.
13 Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Leading Causes of Death, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/fastats/lcod.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2013).
14 President's Cancer Panel, Reducing Environmental Cancer Risk: What We Can Do Now,
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Such data are also critical in identifying and analyzing disparities in levels of
industrial emissions and their attendant exposures in communities characterized
by non-white populations, low socioeconomic status, and political
disenfranchisement. Indeed, the origins of the statute itself are rooted in the
narrative of environmental injustices occurring disproportionately in low-income
communities and communities of color. The Union Carbide disasters in Bhopal
and Institute, and numerous instances of siting environmental disamenities in
historically marginalized communities, such as the 1982 placement of a PBC-
contaminated soil landfill in a majority African American community in Warren
County, North Carolina,15  spurred the development of the grassroots
environmental justice movement in the 1980s.16 This movement is concerned not
only with distributional inequalities in environmental burdens and benefits, but
also with enhancing the people's right to know about the potentially hazardous
environmental exposures in their own backyards.17 Environmental justice
advocates, including members of what became People Concerned About MIC
(PCMIC), an Institute-based environmental health advocacy group, were
instrumental in EPCRA's passage in 1986, providing critical media coverage and
Congressional testimony in Institute about their experiences with their industrial
neighbors. iS
Twenty-five years later, EPCRA's informational mandate is more salient
than ever to the cause of environmental justice, as environmental and public
health scholars continue to discover linkages between race, class, place, and
environmental and health outcomes. Several studies have confirmed the fact that
communities segregated by race and class are "disproportionately likely to live in
15 See Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, NATURAL
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/ej/history/hej.asp (last updated Oct. 12, 2006).
16 Id.
17 Environmental justice, as defined by the EPA, is
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies. EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across this Nation.
It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from
environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making
process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.
Environmental Justice, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/index.html (last updated
Feb. 11, 2013).
18 See, e.g., Abbey Zink, A Decade Later Chemical Industry Still Answering Bhopal, 10 ST. J.
(Charleston, W. Va.), Dec. 1994, at 1. Because the Union Carbide plant in Institute was the only
facility in the U.S. that produced MIC, the small town received a torrent of media attention from
major print and television media outlets, as described in a 1985 documentary by John Gaventa and
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environmentally hazardous neighborhoods."l 9 Even apart from the impacts of
such hazards on physical health outcomes, as discussed above, a 2005 study
found an association between residential proximity to industrial activities and
increased levels of psychological distress, connected to "perceptions of
individual powerlessness and neighborhood disorder." 2 0 Another recently
published study, on the relationship between black/white racial segregation and
lung cancer mortality rates in the U.S., revealed that African Americans living in
highly segregated communities had lung cancer mortality rates 10% higher than
African Americans living in the least segregated communities, even after
controlling for smoking behaviors and socioeconomic differences.21 The authors
of the study noted several possible explanations for these disparities, such as
unequal access to health care services or differences in biological responses to
smoking and other environmental elements, and they suggested a focus on the
physical environment to help diminish these unequal outcomes.22 As the study's
lead author stated, "If you want to learn about someone's health, follow him
home." 23
But beyond the statute's utility for further important research on
environmental and public health impacts of industrial activities, much of
EPCRA's power derives from its role in facilitating proper emergency
preparedness and industry accountability to impacted communities. By
understanding the implications and risks associated with reported emissions,
along with comparative outcomes among industries in different neighborhoods,
citizens can be more effective at protecting themselves during industrial
emergencies and advocating against industrial abuses, thus placing them on a
more even playing field with their powerful industrial neighbors.
This Note will evaluate EPCRA's effectiveness for advancing citizen
awareness and advocacy, emergency preparedness, and citizen enforcement of its
informational mandate. It will focus on three key provisions of the statute: the
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), the Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs), and the enforcement powers of the citizen suit provision. Additionally,
19 Awori J. Hayanga et al., Residential Segregation and Lung Cancer Mortality in the United
States, 148 JAMA SURGERY 37, 41 (2013).
20 Liam Downey & Marieke Van Willigen, Environmental Stressors: The Mental Health
Impacts of Living Near Industrial Activity, 46 J. Soc. BEHAv. 289, 305 (2005).
21 Hayanga et al., supra note 19, at 40. By contrast, lung cancer mortality rates for white
Americans living in highly segregated communities were 3% lower than white Americans living in
the least segregated communities. Id. Lung cancer leads in rates of mortality among all forms of
cancer, and African Americans have the highest lung cancer mortality rates of all racial
demographics. See id. at 37.
22 See id. at 41.
23 Sabrina Tavernise, Segregation Linked in Study With Lung Cancer Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/health/study-links-segregation-and-lung-
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interviews with members of the Institute advocacy organization PCMIC will
provide context for the challenges of implementing EPCRA, particularly in
under-resourced, politically disenfranchised communities. 24
Part II will provide a brief history of the small, unincorporated, and
predominantly African American town of Institute, its relationship with the
former Union Carbide plant (now Bayer CropScience), and the recent litigation
leading to elimination of MIC storage and production at Bayer. Next, Part III will
provide a critique of the aforementioned provisions of EPCRA, as well as several
recommendations for improving the transparency and effectiveness of the Act.
First, the TRI, the statute's standout provision, has provided researchers, the
media, and to a certain extent, citizens with unprecedented information about the
types and quantities of chemicals produced and released into the environment by
most industries in the nation. Improvements in personal technology, such as
computers and smartphones, have spurred the development of powerful tools that
translate TRI data in ways that have aided health and environment researchers in
advancing their scholarship, and have the potential to provide citizens with more
powerful, nuanced, and easily accessible information about facility emissions and
their attendant health and environmental impacts. However, technological and
educational barriers diminish their potential utility for many of the most impacted
citizens, ultimately detracting from the central purpose of the statute-supporting
the public's right to know about harmful emissions in their local environment. If
EPCRA is to fulfill this purpose, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
must consider and accommodate these challenges in the future development of
TRI tools. To this end, public facilities like local libraries, outfitted with the
necessary technology (and analog forms of the same information) along with
trained personnel, are essential to closing this access gap. Additionally, the EPA
could better utilize existing forms of information, such as the highly readable and
detailed chemical profiles included in the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)
mandated by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
This would allow citizens to better identify and understand the risks associated
with chemicals produced in their communities.
24 Interviews were conducted via email at various times and in Institute, W. Va., on October
7-9, 2011, with five members of PCMIC:
I) Sue Davis, native of Institute, original member of PCMIC;
2) Donna Willis, native of Institute, original member of PCMIC;
3) Maya Nye, native of St. Albans, W. Va. in the Kanawha Valley,
member of PCMIC since the late 1990s;
4) Pamela Nixon, native of Charleston, W. Va. in the Kanawha Valley,
original member of PCMIC and Environmental Advocate, West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP); and
5) Warne Ferguson: native of Institute, original member of PCMIC.
381
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Second, EPCRA's crucial state and local emergency planning mandate is
vastly under-resourced. The required Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs) are staffed by volunteer citizens and safety professionals on top of their
existing commitments. They must contribute many hours not only to developing
effective emergency plans for large communities, but also to processing citizen
requests for information pursuant to EPCRA's other provisions. LEPC duties
have increased in the wake of 9/11 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as they were
required to incorporate contingency plans for natural disasters and terrorist
attacks into their existing industrial emergency plans. Where resources do exist,
they are generally sparse and allocated on a competitive basis. Unsurprisingly,
these conditions result in many defunct or nearly defunct LEPCs across the
country, further undermining the purpose of the statute. To create the proper
safeguards against all hazards, as expressly intended in the statute, Congress
must provide adequate, non-competitive financial and technical resources to
LEPCs, and mandate cost sharing by state governments. Finally, it will be critical
for citizens and governments to collaborate in the stringent enforcement of
EPCRA's informational mandate, as effective emergency plans are contingent
upon the availability of information on local industries.
Third, EPCRA's citizen suit provision, which expressly allows citizens to sue
facilities on behalf of the government for non-compliance with the statute, has
been effectively defunct since the Supreme Court's 1998 ruling in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment,25 which held that citizen-plaintiffs lack
Constitutional standing to litigate wholly past violations of EPCRA. The ultimate
impact of this decision is that citizens have no recourse to hold industries
accountable for failing to file the required information on time. Information
related to chemical hazards is most valuable when it is timely. Stripping citizens
of their ability to punish companies that miss the deadlines leaves little incentive
for industries to ever file on time. Without timely information, LEPCs cannot
create informed emergency plans, citizens are hindered in their efforts to keep
industries accountable for their emissions, and researchers' efforts to create new
knowledge about industrial impacts on the environment and public health are
severely thwarted. To restore integrity to EPCRA, Congress must amend the
citizen suit provision to expressly allow suits for wholly past violations of the
statute.
Finally, the Conclusion provides a brief summary of EPCRA's challenges
and the main proposals for improvement. The central argument of this Note is
normative: EPCRA is an invaluable resource for building knowledge about
industry impacts and creating comprehensive emergency plans for all
communities. It also has the potential to empower thousands of fenceline
communities with information to hold neighboring industries accountable for
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their impacts on citizen and environmental health. But to reach those ideals, it
must be revised, and its implementation strategies must change. The EPA must
develop informational tools that are both physically and interpretively accessible
to those who are most impacted by industry practices. Congress must allocate
direct, adequate, and non-competitive funding to LEPCs so that they can properly
and comfortably fulfill their important purpose. And Congress must amend the
citizen suit provision of the statute to allow citizens to hold industries
accountable for failing to abide by the express information deadlines in the
statute.
I. INSTITUTE, WEST VIRGINIA AND UNION CARBIDE: A BRIEF HISTORY
Located along the Kanawha River, approximately nine miles from the state
capital of Charleston, Institute is an unincorporated community in the center of
what is known as "Chemical Valley"26 due to the more than 20 chemical
manufacturing facilities surrounding the several towns located there.27 By
population metrics like the U.S. Census and county demographic records, it is
effectively an invisible town, due to both its unincorporated status and its racial
demographics.2 8 Although Institute is only one of several other unincorporated
towns in the area, it is the only majority African American town in the Kanawha
Valley. By contrast, almost 90% of the Kanawha Valley identified as white in the
2010 Census.29
The African American community in the Kanawha Valley was established in
the 1800s and quickly became known for its landownership. Pursuant to the
26 See Associated Press, West Virginians Divided About Living in 'Chemical Valley,'
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 20, 1985, at DIO.
27 ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 51
(3d ed. 2000).
28 According to the Philadelphia Region Census Bureau, which collects West Virginia census
data, Institute is not large enough to be designated as a Census Designated Place, and is thus
counted as part of a larger geographic area in Kanawha County. Telephone Interview with Kevin
Holmes, U.S. Census Bureau, Phila. Region (Apr. 23, 2013). The West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources, which collects census data, was only able to provide one census tract
for Institute (Tract 104), but stipulated that the area could encompass more than one tract.
Telephone Interview with Tom Light, Programmer for Statistical Services, W. Va. Dep't of Health
and Human Res. (Apr. 23, 2013). Kanawha County itself is 89.2% white, and 7.4% black. State &
County QuickFacts: Kanawha County, West Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/54/54039.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2013). Institute, as
affirmed by all of the PCMIC members, most of whom have lived in Institute since World War II
or earlier, is approximately 90% black. See also BULLARD, supra note 27, at 51 ("Blacks compose
over 90% of the community's population."). Although the other unincorporated communities in the
area are not represented in the demographic data, they are majority white, and are thus adequately
captured in the demographic profile of the area.
29 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 28.
30 See BULLARD, supra note 27, at 51.
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Second Morrill Act of 1890,3' the community residents successfully petitioned
the state legislature to site the West Virginia Colored Institute 3 2 near where they
had already bought homes and formed neighborhoods.33 The community was
named Institute after the school.34
Siblings Sue Davis and Wame Ferguson are native residents of Institute, and
belong to a prominent family of landowners and educators in the area. 35 The
story of the land their uncle owned, which is where the Bayer plant is now
located, is well documented. In 1930, he sold the land to the state to build the
historic Wertz Field, the "first airport in the Charleston area to offer scheduled
airline service."36 After World War II began in 1939, the Wertz Field was used
increasingly to train military pilots through the National Civilian Pilot Training
Program, including a number of Tuskegee Airmen, who were students at West
Virginia State College.3 7 When the federal government purchased the property in
order to build a rubber factory to support the war effort, however, Davis and
Ferguson's uncle sued, claiming a violation of a covenant ensuring the land
would not be used for anything other than the Wertz Field. He was paid $27,000
to drop the claim.39 "If my uncle knew then what his land is being used for now,"
Davis asserted, "he never would have sold."40
Union Carbide purchased the plant in 1947 and still operates a portion of it
today, although ownership of the facility is now shared among several chemical
firms, such as Praxair and Dow Chemical Company. 41 From its inception, the
plant proved to be a source of fear and resentment to the Institute community,
which was transforming from a thriving center of education and power for
African Americans into a dangerous industrial town.4 2
31 Ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 322-328 (2006)).
32 The school was renamed West Virginia State College in 1929, and then West Virginia State
University in 2004. History and Traditions: Our History Runs Deep, WEST VIRGINIA STATE
UNIVERSITY, http://www.wvstateu.edulAbout-WVSU/History-and-Traditions.aspx (last visited Apr.
15, 2013).
33 See BULLARD, supra note 28, at 51.
34 Interview with Sue Davis in Institute, W. Va. (Oct. 7, 2011).
35 Id.
36 Louis E. Keefer, Wertz Field, W. VA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.wvencyclopedia.org/
articles/987 (last updated Nov. 12, 2010).
37 Id.; see also Interview with Sue Davis, supra note 34.
38 Keefer, supra note 36.
39 Interview with Sue Davis, supra note 34.
40 Id.
41 Interview with Pam Nixon in Institute, W. Va. (Oct. 7, 2011). Ms. Nixon also gave a
PowerPoint presentation at the interview entitled "Institute: The Journey," chronicling the history
of Union Carbide beginning in 1947. See also, Who We Are: Institute, BAYER CROPSCIENCE,
http://www.bayercropscience.us/who-we-are/institute (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
42 Another significant change in Institute came after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
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It's been hell. In 1954 was our first disaster. The skies from that
plant lit up like the sun . . . it was completely orange as far as
you could see in the Institute area. My sister was living by
herself and I was in Charleston. I got as far away as Dunbar and
could still see the orange. I went to her and we ran outta there.
She got sick, and eventually died of emphysema.4 3
Although the community was deeply concerned with the chemical threat of
the Union Carbide plant, efforts to organize and advocate for industry
accountability did not fully emerge until the subsequent incidents in Bhopal and
Institute.44 Several community members, including Davis, Willis, and Ferguson,
formed People Concerned About MIC (PCMIC) shortly after Bhopal, when they
discovered that Union Carbide also stored MIC at the Institute plant.45 Fears
about industrial safety, health impacts of MIC and other chemicals, and the
possibility of a Bhopal-like disaster spread through the country, particularly after
the 1985 Union Carbide accident.4 6 This gave strong credence to the emerging
environmental justice movement, which identified inequalities in environmental
burdens suffered by poor communities and communities of color.47 The public
outcry galvanized Congress, which sent a small delegation of representatives,
including Senator Henry Waxman of California and Representative Bob Wise of
West Virginia, to Institute to investigate.4 8 Pamela Nixon, an Institute resident
who got involved in PCMIC after Bhopal and lives in close proximity to the
facility, witnessed firsthand Union Carbide's denial of any potential parallels
between the facilities in Bhopal and Institute.
[After Bhopal], Union Carbide was saying that nothing like that
would happen in Institute. And when 135 people ended up going
to the hospital [after the Institute leak], the plants ended up
college, quickly integrated-although the town did not-and enrolled a majority of white students,
who mostly commuted to the school by the 1980s. See BULLARD, supra note 27, at 51-52.
43 Interview with Warne Ferguson in Institute, W. Va. (Oct. 7, 2011).
44 Interview with Pam Nixon, supra note 41.
45 Id.
46 See Rebecca S. Weeks, The Bumpy Road to Community Preparedness: The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 827, 833 (1997-98) ("As a result of
these accidents, in 1985 and 1986, Americans became increasingly concerned about the activities
of the chemical factories next door. One newspaper described the general attitude as
'chemophobia."').
47 Although communities had been advocating against disparate environmental impacts since
the 1960s, the environmental justice movement began in 1982 with a protest against a landfill in
Warren County, N.C. in which "more than 500 people were arrested, the first arrests in U.S. history
over the siting of a landfill." Skelton & Miller, supra note 15.
48 Interview with Pam Nixon, supra note 41.
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saying, 'you can't compare that to Bhopal.' PCMIC had
meetings every week to have them explain the releases to the
public.49
Nixon, Davis, and several other PCMIC members participated in
Congressional hearings on the incidents, providing their observations and
demands for greater industry accountability for the health and safety of the
communities surrounding their facilities.50 EPCRA emerged in 1986 as a type of
covenant between facilities and their communities for increased communication
about the dangers posed by the chemicals produced and emitted, and for greater
collaboration to make effective emergency plans.
Because EPCRA's provisions only govern public access to information and
emergency planning, organizations like PCMIC cannot use the statute itself as an
action-forcing tool for pollution prevention in the same way it could use other
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species
Act.5' What EPCRA can do-and arguably did do in Institute-is provide a
means of keeping industry activities and performance standards in the public
spotlight to force companies to consider self-regulation to maintain shareholder
support, to build important community relations, and to reduce the costs of
wasteful production.52 Thus, despite continuous malfeasance by what is now
Bayer CropScience, as documented by Nixon in her capacity at the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP)," PCMIC was able to incite
public scrutiny of the storage and emissions of MIC in the community.
The organization's efforts reached a critical crossroads on August 28, 2008,
when an explosion at Bayer's Larvin pesticide unit killed two workers and
released unknown quantities of toxic chemicals into the neighborhood, causing a
fire that burned for more than four hours.5 4 The residue treater that exploded was
propelled into the air by a runaway chemical reaction, 70 feet away from the
aboveground MIC storage tank. 5 Ferguson's wife, who was at home during the
incident, developed breathing troubles a few days later and died within two
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Indeed, whereas the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act govern actual
environmental harm, EPCRA is simply an information mandate. One critique of the statute is that it
does not offer a cause of action to actually reduce the emissions that ultimately cause emergencies,
however egregious those reported emissions may be. See Abrams & Ward, supra note 2, at 136-38.
52 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 80.
53 Interview with Pam Nixon, supra note 41. Ms. Nixon discussed several permit violations of
and enforcement actions against the plant from the 1980s to the present.
54 See U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Bd., Report No. 2008-08-1-WV,
Pesticide Chemical Runaway Reaction Pressure Vessel Explosion: Bayer CropScience, LP,
Institute, West Virginia, August 28, 2008, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter CSB Report].
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months.16 Similarly, a student at West Virginia State University, who was living
in a dorm on the side of campus farthest from the plant, died of respiratory illness
a few days after the explosion.
In the spring of 2011, PCMIC members and other residents filed suit against
Bayer to enjoin further storage or use of MIC at the plant.' 8 The federal district
court granted a preliminary injunction against MIC production59 pending Bayer's
implementation of recommendations made by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board
(CSB), which determined that the explosion was caused by poor safety protocols,
untrained operations personnel, and malfunctioning equipment.6 0 Submitting to
pressure from the public and threats of further investigations by the CSB and the
EPA, Bayer decided to phase MIC out of its production processes in 2011.61 For
members of PCMIC, the victory was a bittersweet end to the lengthy, heavily
resourced battle for accountability from Union Carbide and Bayer.
[W]e were kind of sad we didn't get to beat them in court. But
even though we weren't the ultimate reason they quit using MIC,
we felt that we still made an impact by keeping the public
informed about it. 62
II. EPCRA IN INSTITUTE: How EFFECTIVE?
EPCRA has four central mandates: emergency planning at the state and local
levels, emergency emissions notifications, public reporting of storage and
transportation of hazardous chemicals by industrial facilities, and the
maintenance of a toxics release inventory to inform the public about certain
hazardous substances being released into communities.63 As with most
environmental statutes, Congress also added a citizen suit provision to EPCRA,
allowing private causes of action for industry non-compliance with the
informational mandates of the statute.
56 See Ferguson v. Bayer CropScience, L.P., No. 2:11 -cv-00087, 2011 WL 4479008, at *1
(S.D. W. Va. Sept. 26, 2011).
57 See Lawrence Smith, Lawsuit Links Student's Death to '08 Bayer Explosion, W. VA. REC.,
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/230046-lawsuit-links-students-death-to-08-bayer-
explosion.
58 See Ferguson, 2011 WL 4479008, at *1.
59 Id.
60 See CSB REPORT, supra note 54, at 3.
61 See Jeff Johnson, Methyl Isocynate: Bayer Ends Use of Infamous Chemical at West
Virginia Plant, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2011, at 10.
62 Interview with Maya Nye in Institute, W. Va. (Oct. 9, 2011).
63 See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11023 (2006).
64 See id. § I 1046(a)(1).
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Prior to EPCRA's passage in 1986, there was no federal mandate for
emergency preparedness for industrial disasters.65 States varied widely in their
levels of planning. In New York, for instance, witnesses at public hearings in the
wake of the Bhopal disaster "recounted responses [to previous incidents] that
were dominated by confusion, fear, and lack of information."6 6 Institute was
supported by a local emergency committee for 34 years prior to the passage of
EPCRA, but the Kanawha Valley Industrial Emergency Planning Council
membership included only industrial groups and the West Virginia State Police 67
before the 1985 Union Carbide accident.
Similarly, public right-to-know laws mandating compulsory industry
reporting of hazardous materials and toxic emissions were codified only at the
state level prior to 1986, and as such, there were no federally mandated baseline
standards for reporting and enforcement. 68 The birth of EPCRA thus heralded a
significant power shift for regulators, public health experts, environmentalists,
and concerned citizens, who were given unprecedented access to information that
could be used to force corporate responsibility, make practical decisions about
where to live, and evaluate wasteful chemical production processes. 69 The statute
is commendable for using information technology to improve industrial
transparency, but implementation faces many practical and political challenges.
This is particularly true in communities like Institute, which are dominated
politically and economically by large industries, and lack adequate public
representation of their interests.
The following Sections use the example of EPCRA's implementation in
Institute to offer a critique of three of the statute's most important provisions: the
Toxics Release Inventory, local emergency planning, and citizen enforcement of
the statute.
A. Toxics Release Inventory: An Equal Right to Know?
Perhaps the most celebrated of EPCRA's provisions is the Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI). The first regulatory mandate requiring a "publicly accessible
online computer system," 7 0 TRI reports yearly emissions, transfers, and disposals
65 See Abrams & Ward, supra note 2, at 144.
66 Id. at 156.
67 History, KANAWHA PUTNAM EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMIrrTEE, https://www.kpepc.org/
Home/Who-Are-We/History.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). Kanawha County had an emergency
planning committee prior to EPCRA, which restructured to meet the federal requirements for Local
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) after the passage of the statute.
68 See Abrams & Ward, supra note 2, at 151-56.
69 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 248-49.
70 Gary D. Bass & Alair MacLean, Enhancing the Public's Right-To-Know About
Environmental Issues, 4 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 287, 288 (1993).
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of over 650 hazardous chemicals from more than 20,000 U.S. facilities." The
1990 Pollution Prevention Act expanded TRI reporting requirements to include
information about how facilities manage chemicals in their waste and recycling
processes.72 Users of TRI data can determine the volume of yearly chemical
emissions and the percentage released into each environmental medium (air,
water, land), as well as pollution reduction efforts by individual facilities. To
maximize its effectiveness, however, the EPA must prioritize citizen access to
both the raw data and the interpretive tools developed to assess the impacts of the
emissions, and should incorporate existing data on public health, chemical
characteristics, and community demographics to provide a comprehensive picture
of industrial impacts and any resulting disparities.
Understanding the extent of pollution gives environmentalists, community
advocates, and government agencies substantial leverage to negotiate higher
emissions standards and to reduce negative environmental impacts. As early as
1993, five years after the release of the first TRI data, researchers and
policymakers observed significant changes not only in the EPA's environmental
agenda, but also in the relationship between the agency and citizen advocates.
Experience with TRI has shown that public access assists EPA in
achieving its mission of environmental protection in three
distinct ways. First, the public becomes active in pursuing issues,
such as pollution prevention, thus enriching the resource base of
the agency. Second, public access helps EPA personnel pursue a
more coordinated approach to enforcement and to understand
what is occurring in other sections of the agency. Finally, public
access improves data quality, thereby improving program
enforcement.74
Emissions data reflect substantial yearly decreases in total facility emissions
since the passage of the statute. In 1988, the base year chosen by the EPA for the
program, approximately 20,000 facilities reported on-site emissions and transfers
of more than 300 listed chemicals with an aggregate total of 6.2 billion pounds.
By 2011, 21,000 facilities reported releases and transfers of 650 listed chemicals,
but the total only came to 4.1 billion pounds.
71 TRI Program Fact Sheet, EPA (2011), http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/RY_201 1_TRI_
Factsheet.pdf.
72 What Is the Toxics Release Inventory Program?, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogrami/
whatis.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2013).
73 TRI Program Fact Sheet, supra note 71.
74 Bass & MacLean, supra note 70, at 303.
75 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 59, 75-76.
76 See TRI Program Fact Sheet, supra note 71.
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The caveat to such progress, however, is that these data raise many critical
questions, particularly about reliability and whether the statute, as opposed to
other incentives, has been a true impetus for these reductions. TRI data are self-
reported by facilities, which use different mechanisms to measure releases,
including engineering calculations and best judgment.n Actual reductions may
be exaggerated or undervalued by changes in monitoring methodology,
production processes, or reporting requirements.78 Also, because there are many
chemicals not covered under TRI, facilities can choose to replace reportable
chemicals with those that are still unlisted, so as to avoid public scrutiny.79
Despite these challenges, TRI remains a critical tool for bolstering public
awareness of and corporate accountability for environmental harm and public
health risks. To increase the program's efficacy, it is imperative that communities
obtain equitable access to new tools and information generated for clearer, more
nuanced interpretations of the data.
TRI data are available to the public in diverse forms, from paper reports to
extensive electronic spreadsheets, as well as online databases. The databases are
designed to manipulate multiple forms of data, such as health and geographic
information, to identify patterns and trends.80 PCMIC uses the basic data to
compare releases reported by Bayer CropScience with other records the facility
must provide for permits under other statutes.81 This information provides a
backup measure to ensure the integrity of the facility's emissions reporting, and
to show the "company's pattern and propensity towards repeat offenses." 82
The raw emissions data do not, however, provide enough context. Informed
public decision making requires information beyond these raw numbers, such as
exposure levels and pathways, or the health and safety implications of the
emissions levels. The EPA itself acknowledges the limitations of its data,
cautioning TRI users that the information as presented is "inadequate to reach
conclusions on health-related risks,"83 and that individual chemicals "must be
77 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 60, 76. Hamilton highlights a study issued by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, entitled A Right to Know More, that criticized the EPA for only
subjecting a "small subset of chemicals" to reporting requirements. Id. at 78. The goal of such
environmental groups was to provide the public with information on the health effects of reported
toxics in order to put pressure on industries to "reduce the aggregate use of toxics." Id. The fact that
all toxic chemicals are not subject to the reporting requirements deeply hampers those continued
efforts.
78 Id. at 78.
79 Id. at 79.
80 See generally TRI Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridatalindex.html (last
updated Oct. 9, 2012).
81 Email from Maya Nye to author (Feb. 29, 2012).
82 Id. For example, EPCRA data can be useful for tracking emissions violations of other
command and control statutes, such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act.
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evaluated along with the potential and actual exposures[,] . . . the chemical's fate
in the environment and other factors before any statements can be made about
potential risks associated with the chemical or a release." 84 This kind of
information is particularly critical in Institute, where facility emissions are often
strong enough to detect through sight and smell, and residents frequently become
ill with various cancers or neurological disorders.ss
To mitigate this lack of contextual information, the EPA has developed two
major data applications: TRI Chemical Hazard Information Profiles (TRI-CHIP),
which identifies the health impacts of individual chemicals, 86 and the Risk-
Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) Model, which uses TRI data to
generate trends and patterns of exposure to the toxins that may pose the greatest
risks to the public.87 However, these tools, while technically available to much of
the public due to the increased availability of computers and the internet,
ultimately lack usability by average citizens. The applications are not compatible
with all computers because they may require particular internet browsers (e.g.
Internet Explorer), specialized software (e.g. Microsoft Access), administration
rights, or extensive computer memory. 88 Users also require some background
expertise in health or data analysis to fully benefit from the information
generated.89
The equity implications of these challenges are clear when one considers that
many communities burdened by polluting facilities are also less likely to have the
necessary equipment to access these databases, much less the resources to train
citizens to properly interpret and use the data in their advocacy. For instance,
although Institute is mixed-income and centered around a university, most of the
individuals involved in pollution prevention advocacy are older, and many do not
have ready access to computers. 90 Moreover, no local programs exist to train
computer-equipped citizens on how to read the data and maximize their
84 Id.
85 Interview with Donna Willis in Institute, W. Va. (Oct. 7, 2011). See also Interview with
Sue Davis, supra note 34 ("You could go down the streets and count the cancers and neurological
diseases by house. There was one case where we had three aneurysms in one household.").
86 Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, TRI-Chemical Hazard Information Profiles,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tri-chip/index.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2012).
87 Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/rsei/ (last
updated June 24, 2012).
88 TRI-CHIP for example, requires the user to obtain Microsoft Access to properly use the
tool. See TRI-Chemical Hazard Information Profiles, supra note 86. RSEI requires administration
rights, Internet Explorer, and a significant amount of memory to operate. See Risk-Screening
Environmental Indicators (RSEI), supra note 87.
89 See Richard Engler, Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI), EPA 9 (Feb. 13,
2008), http://www.ecos.org/files/3028-file Englerj Presentation.ppt. Engler's 2008 presentation
highlights the fact that RSEI is used primarily by government agencies, academics, and industries,
all of whom typically have the resources required for appropriate RSEI training and physical access
to the application itself.
90 Interview with Pam Nixon, supra note 41.
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usefulness. 9' The EPA conducts biyearly national trainings for TRI data, but they
are quite costly and "too time consuming for the average person."92 And although
self-tutelage is possible, as demonstrated by Nye and Davis, who learned to read
the basic data with some assistance from Nixon, 93 it is ultimately unsustainable
as a means of effectively informing the larger public and maximizing the benefits
of the more contextualized data available in these complex databases and
applications.
One promising TRI tool is an application called myRight-To-Know
(myRTK), which is designed for use on the web as well as on web-enabled
mobile phones.94 No additional software is required to operate the program.
Users simply enter a location, and the application displays all TRI-reporting
facilities in the area on a Google map. 9 5 A pie chart shows the percentage of
overall emissions released from the facility into each environmental medium, and
there is a list of emissions volumes for the facility's reportable chemicals.9 6 Each
facility is ranked nationally according to its releases, and users can determine
what percentage of the county's total emissions is generated by each facility in
the area. 97 Data columns beside each chemical indicate whether it has been
associated with cancer or other health effects, a colored graphic indicates the
facility's quarterly compliance status for the last three years, and two final rows
indicate the time of the facility's last full inspection and the number of formal
enforcement actions brought against the facility within a five-year period.98
Finally, the application links to a more detailed facility report, which offers more
enforcement and compliance data from other EPA regulatory programs, eight-
year TRI reported emissions, and demographic data on communities within a
91 Id.
92 See Email from Maya Nye, supra note 81. The regular registration fee for the TRI Training
Conferences is typically around $300, not including travel expenses and lodging. Although travel
scholarships are available to waive the registration fee, they are very limited in number. See
Environmental Council of States & EPA TRI Program, Annual TRI National Training Conference
(2009), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/1 25300375/2009-Annual-TRI-National-
Training-Conference. While the TRI Training Conference lasts for approximately three days, it is
unclear how much time would be required to master the more complex applications.
93 Email Interview with Maya Nye, supra note 81.
94 See myRTK, EPA, http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/info.jsp (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
95 Id. Users must search for the facility under the "Search" tab of the application. Facilities
are displayed on the "Map" and "List" tabs.
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one-, three-, and five-mile radius of the facility. 9 9 The information is available in
both English and Spanish. oo
A search for Institute reveals two TRI-reporting facilities, along with five
other facilities with permits for chemical discharges under other EPA
programs. 1' Data for Bayer CropScience indicates that the majority of its
emissions (548,787 pounds) are discharged into the water, and almost all of the
rest (273,699 pounds) are released into the air. 102 Five out of twenty-one reported
chemicals are associated with cancer, and all are linked with other unnamed
health impacts. 103 In terms of annual chemical releases, Bayer is ranked 88th of
2,959 TRI-reporting chemical industries in the nation.'1 Of thirteen TRI
facilities in Kanawha County, Bayer is responsible for 30% of the total TRI
releases for the reporting year.105 The facility's three-year environmental permit
compliance status (October 2009-September 2012) is listed as unknown or
unavailable; however, a link to further compliance data (i.e. EPA Enforcement &
Compliance History Online (ECHO)) indicates several formal enforcement
actions against the plant in the past five years by both state and federal
agencies.106 The ECHO report for Bayer CropScience currently lists no
demographic information for the local population, but previous visits to the
website in recent years listed the incorrect figure that African Americans
comprised only 5.2% of the population within a one-mile radius of the plant.10 7
Health statistics collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) are available through a link in the census data, if provided, offering
99 Id. The "Detailed Facility Report" can be found by clicking the "More Compliance Data"
link at the bottom of the graphic facility report.
100 Id. The "Search" tab contains an option to switch to the Spanish-language version of
myRTK.
101 Id.
102 See Facility Report: Bayer CropScience LP, EPA, http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/
report.jsp? IDT=TRI&ID=25112RHNPLROUTE (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
103 Id.
104 Id. The list is ranked highest to lowest emitters.
105 Id.
106 Detailed Facility Report: Bayer CropScience Institute Plant, EPA ENFORCEMENT &
COMPLIANCE HISTORY ONLINE (ECHO), http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/
report.jsp?IDT=TRI&ID= 25112RHNPLROUTE (click "More Compliance Data" at bottom of
page) (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
107 Id. The author's last visit to the website prior to the deletion of this census data was April
2012. Similar data are available in the ECHO report for the Union Carbide facility, which is part of
the same industrial complex. See EJView, EPA, http://oaspub.epa.gov/envjust/env.justejv.get
geom?reportjtype=html&census-
type=bg2k&pcallei-self&coords=-81.796850,38.388216&feattype-point&radius=1.0 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013) (noting that African Americans make up 5.2% of the residential population within a
one-mile radius). Users can view the health statistics by clicking on the "Health" tab on this page.
The census data was likely flawed due to Institute's unincorporated status, and the fact that the U.S.
Census data does not capture unincorporated towns. See supra note 28. The percentage of African
Americans in the county is only 7.4%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 28.
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figures on various disease rates in the county and state, but no indication of
whether or how those figures correlate with exposure to toxic emissions.'0 The
additional information provided by the National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment
(NATA), however, does provide some risk estimates for cancer, neurological
hazards and respiratory hazards. CDC statistics collected for Kanawha and
Putnam Counties from 1988-92 indicate that death rates from heart disease
ranged from 123.5 out of 100,000 people for white females to 302.5 for black
males.' 09 Similarly, death rates for all cancers ranged from 122.6 per 100,000
people for white females to 214.4 for black males."o Perhaps most startling,
however, the 2005 NATA risk estimates for Kanawha County were in the 93rd
percentile for cancer, in the 90th percentile for neurological hazard risk, and in
the 88th percentile for respiratory hazard risk, all of which, with the exception of
the neurological hazard risk, were significantly higher than the statewide risk
estimates.' '
Due in large part to its simplicity, myRTK is the most transparent and user-
friendly of the TRI applications. For Institute residents, much of what it offers is
concrete evidence that reinforces what many already know or suspect: that the
Bayer CropScience facility emits a large amount of toxics into the air, that the
facility has been a persistent violator of its permits, that the demographic data for
the area is misunderstood or wholly inaccurate, and that rates of cancer and
neurological disorders in their community are very high.112 Any new insight to be
gained from myRTK is limited by the TRI data: because toxic releases are only
available in the aggregate, the data lack details on the rates of releases into the
environment and the significance of releases relative to the toxicity of the
chemicals,"l 3 all of which can help communities to establish relative levels of
human exposure over time. Further, the CDC health data, while informative, are
mostly dated from the 1990s and not contextualized in terms of the TRI
chemicals,1 4 which might give users a sense of the levels of exposure that are
108 See EJView, supra note 107. Users can view the health statistics by clicking on the
"Health" tab on this page.
109 Id.
110 Id.
Ill Id. The 2005 neurological hazard risk was in the 94th percentile for West Virginia.
112 Interview with Donna Willis, supra note 85. Over the course of the interview, Ms. Willis,
who has lived in Institute for her entire life, attested to common knowledge of Bayer CropScience's
permit violations, the communities' exposure to toxins, the skewed demographic data because of
the town's unincorporated status, and the various health outcomes in the community, namely
cancer and neurological disorders.
113 Bass & MacLean, supra note 70, at 302.
114 See EJView, supra note 108. The CDC data offer only general statistics about illnesses in
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associated with illness. The TRI data in the myRTK application is also undated,
so users cannot know whether it is current." 5
Ultimately, most citizens, particularly those unfamiliar with TRI, are likely to
come away from such data with more questions than answers. Although other
resources exist to fill some of the gaps, they are either unincorporated into the
more user-friendly applications (e.g. myRTK) such that average users would not
know to look for them, or they are made available upon written request to the
LEPCs. For example, pursuant to the Material Safety Data Sheets section of
EPCRA, facilities must submit information to State Emergency Response
Commissions (SERCs) and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) on
all chemicals handled or manufactured subject to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration Act (OSHA), which requires reporting for a larger range
of chemicals than TRI." 6 Each facility must prepare and submit profiles on each
of the OSHA-regulated chemicals it manufactures or stores over a threshold
volume. These profiles, called Material Data Safety Sheets (MSDS), contain
information on the characteristics of each chemical, its known health hazards,
and recommended safety precautions."l 7 MSDS are available to the public by
request to LEPCs or SERCs, although many are linked from the EPA's
website."8 Additionally, data derived from MSDS are incorporated into the more
complex EPA databases, such as RSEI and TRI-CHIP, providing important
contextual information about individual chemicals and their respective traits and
impacts."l 9 Nixon, who has received training on TRI data, reported that the
MSDS are also the most user-friendly tools for the public, as they are simple and
readable.120
Facilities must also submit to SERCs and LEPCs annual inventory
information on all OSHA-regulated chemicals, including the average daily
amount on-site, the maximum amount allowed at any time, and the location of
each chemical.121 This information is designed to assist LEPCs in identifying and
prioritizing the existing hazards in their communities for the purpose of
incorporating them into local emergency plans. However, facilities in many states
have discretion to submit the information in two different forms. They may
provide either Tier I information, which only contains aggregate chemical
volumes by category of hazard, or Tier II information, which is more detailed
115 See, e.g., Facility Report: Bayer CropScience LP, supra note 102.
116 EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11021 (2006).
117 See Abrams & Ward, supra note 2, at 153.
118 See TRI Program, TRI-Listed Chemicals, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/trichemicals/index.
htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2013).
119 MSDS information is incorporated into TRI-CHIP and RSEI databases. See TRI, supra
note 86; RSEI, supra note 87.
120 Interview with Pam Nixon, supra note 41.
121 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
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and includes the individual names and locations of chemicals.12 2 Although many
states now require Tier II information, which is far more useful for community
risk assessment and targeted emergency planning,12 3 several states still permit
facilities to opt for only Tier I disclosures. Further, because of concerns over
homeland security, particularly after 9/11, states may restrict public access to
such information to an as-needed basis. 124 In West Virginia, for example, Tier II
information can only be released after a formal request to the relevant LEPC of
the SERC pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and with the
written authorization of the Director of West Virginia Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management/State Emergency Response
Commission.125 Information may be redacted if it is protected under the federal
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program, or if it contains trade
secrets, or the facility indicates that it wants to keep the location of its production
site confidential.12 6
TRI's knowledge-based tools offered communities unprecedented access to
the operations of the facilities surrounding them. This empowered community
members to organize and advocate for decreased emissions or even the removal
of the highly toxic chemicals that had subjected them to substantial health risks,
122 See Abrams & Ward, supra note 2, at 155.
123 Id.
124 For a discussion of the tension between EPCRA's information provision and national
security concerns, see Trang T. Tran, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act and National Security: Restricting Public Access to Location Information of Hazardous
Chemicals, 8 ENVTL. LAw 369 (2001-2002). Tran argues that "Congress should amend EPCRA to
(1) restrict public access to some information by excluding location information of hazardous
chemicals from the publicly available documents and (2) allow federal preemption of state law in
certain circumstances." Id. at 370; see also Katherine Chekouras, Balancing National Security with
a Community's Right-to-Know: Maintaining Public Access to Environmental Information Through
EPCRA's Non-Preemption Clause, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 107, 109 (2007) (arguing that state
right-to-know legislation, if not preempted by federal law, can "respect legitimate national security
concerns, and. . . critically assess[] what information is publicly disclosed").
125 Telephone Interview with Melissa Buckley, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act Title Ill Project Manager, W. Va. Div. of Homeland Sec. & Emergency Mgmt. (Apr. 23,
2013).
126 Id; see also Tier II Instructions, W. VA. Div. HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY
MGMT. 5 http://www.dhsem.wv.gov/SERC/Documents/Tier%2011%201nstructions.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013). Section 322 of EPCRA authorizes facilities to withhold information on a
chemical's identity if it provides sufficient evidence that the chemical identity is a trade secret.
Such information must still be provided to the EPA Administrator, but will be withheld from public
disclosure. 42 U.S.C. § l1042(a)(2) (2006). Subsection (b) lists the requirements for trade secret
status, including efforts to protect confidentiality and potential competitive harm from disclosure.
Id. § 11042(b). Individuals hoping to challenge an alleged trade secret may initiate a review
process. See id. § 11042(d). Trade secret protection is not absolute: certain health-related
information may not be withheld from health professionals, id. § I1042(e), and information on the
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degraded the environment, and decreased the quality of their lives and the value
of their properties.127 Forced to finally confront their pollution, industries
responded both to external pressures from activist communities and shareholders,
and to internal pressures from industry leadership concerned with the high costs
of wasteful production processes.128 The disclosure mandate can thus boast
benefits from many perspectives. In Institute, the implementation of TRI was
instrumental in PCMIC's 25-year fight to eliminate MIC from the Bayer
CropScience plant, providing critical data about the amounts released into the
community and raising awareness about the prospects of a Bhopal-like disaster in
America.129
After 25 years, TRI data are widely integrated into new informational tools,
which combine data on public health, geography, and other pertinent metrics to
provide a more detailed portrait of the risks posed by reported releases to
communities and the environment.130 In the quest for more detailed information,
however, the EPA has created instruments that lack basic accessibility and
usability by much of the public, particularly those living in the most
economically and environmentally burdened communities. Considering that
people living in unincorporated towns like Institute lack their own political
representation, it is even more critical that easily accessible and usable tools be
available to support community empowerment. MyRTK, which shows great
promise as a standard, universally available tool for understanding and
contextualizing TRI data, lowers the barrier of usability, but still requires access
to an internet-enabled computer or smartphone.13' Further, unlike the EPA's
more complex applications, myRTK does not integrate data from other sources to
properly contextualize the TRI releases in terms of toxicity and health risk.132
Such disparities in information create the risk of further stratification between
environmentally burdened and environmentally benefited communities, due to
the relative inability of under-resourced environmentally burdened communities
to access, process, and act on this information.
There are, however, viable solutions to these inequities. As a starting
measure, LEPCs could compile MSDS for all state facilities and make them
available in paper form at public spaces, such as local libraries, so that citizens do
not have to make formal requests to access them. '3 LEPCs could also simply
include a link on their websites to EPA's MSDS database for those with internet
access. Additionally, following the example of the National Institute for
127 See generally HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 208-43.
128 Id.
129 See Email from Maya Nye, supra note 81.
130 See TRI Information, supra note 80.
131 myRTK, supra note 94.
132 Id.
133 According to Nye, the local libraries in Kanawha County did provide this resource, but
cancelled it post-9/1 1. Email from Maya Nye to author (Jan. 22, 2013).
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Chemical Studies in West Virginia, the EPA could provide assistance to SERCs,
LEPCs, or environmental organizations to generate annual scorecards for each
state, 134 ranking facilities according to their emissions, and incorporating
practical information, such as threshold reporting levels and chemical profiles, as
well as more nuanced information, such as exposure pathways and toxicity
statistics. Such information could also be provided in both paper and electronic
format, and made available at public libraries.
Finally, despite the EPA's public disclaimers about the limitations of the
released information, specialized databases like TRI-CHIP and RSEI have
demonstrated the extent to which TRI data may be compiled to provide a more
nuanced view of the impacts of the regulated chemicals on human health and the
environment. MyRTK should offer the same quality of information. The
application should integrate data from the MSDS, such that citizens selecting
chemicals emitted in their communities would receive detailed profiles on
relevant characteristics, along with numerical thresholds of harmful exposure
where available. The CDC data linked to myRTK should appear alongside this
information so that citizens can readily assess the health risks of the individual
toxics, as articulated by the MSDS reports, alongside the available CDC statistics
for the relevant counties and states. All of this information should be regularly
updated so the public has access to the most recent research about the chemicals
that are relevant to their health.
It is virtually undisputed that TRI has garnered great improvements in local
emergency planning and research on the environmental and health impacts of the
covered chemicals. But EPCRA should not be, and arguably was not meant to be,
limited to those gains. The community right to know is about accessibility, not
only of raw data and information, but also of actual understanding of the
implications of that information for the health and safety of community members
and their environment.1 3 5 To properly protect the interests of the public,
particularly those who are disparately impacted by environmental burdens,
information must be contextualized and tailored to provide the answers that
people need to make critical decisions about their health and their lives.
134 See Examples of NICS Projects, NAT'L INST. FOR CHEMICAL STUD., http://www.nicsinfo.
org/examples.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). NICS generated West Virginia Scorecards using TRI
data from the state from the beginning of the TRI program in 1987 until the organization
discontinued the project in 2003. See also West Virginia Scorecard, NAT'L INST. FOR CHEMICAL
STUD., http://www.nicsinfo.org/scorecard.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
135 See Emergency Mgmt., supra note 6 ("The Community Right-to-Know provisions help
increase the public's knowledge and access to information on chemicals at individual facilities,
their uses, and releases into the environment. States and communities, working with facilities, can
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B. Emergency Planning and Response: Is Institute Successful?
Pursuant to EPCRA, states must establish State Emergency Response
Commissions, which are usually incorporated into existing emergency/disaster
response departments.136 In turn, SERCs appoint Local Emergency Planning
Committees (LEPCs) to serve in designated emergency planning districts.'
Membership to LEPCs must include a range of representatives, from elected
officials to community groups and emergency response personnel. 38 LEPCs are
primarily responsible for creating and distributing a local emergency plan and
processing public requests for Tier II information on OSHA-regulated
chemicals.139 The role of LEPCs cannot be overstated. They are communities'
first defense against hazards resulting from industrial activities, natural disasters,
and domestic terrorist attacks. Yet, as illustrated below, their vast responsibilities
are immensely under-supported by the state and federal governments, reducing
community incentive to invest precious time and personal resources in an
arduous task, particularly in areas where the probability of industrial disasters
seems slim. To ensure that all communities are sufficiently protected in case of
emergencies, Congress and the states must provide adequate and non-competitive
financial and technical resources to support LEPCs. Additionally, as emphasized
below, Congress must ensure that the EPA and citizens can stringently enforce
the statute so that LEPCs will have the timely information required to properly
carry out their planning mandate.
As noted, the Kanawha Putnam Emergency Planning Committee (KPEPC),
coordinates emergency planning for Institute.140 Approximately 125 citizens,
community group representatives, facilities managers, emergency response
personnel, and other professionals are currently members of the KPEPC, and new
membership is available by application. 141
By most measures, KPEPC reflects the successful implementation of
EPCRA's emergency planning provision. Indeed, the capacity for emergency
planning in Institute and the surrounding Kanawha Valley was not one of the
major concerns expressed by the PCMIC organizers, although, as will be
discussed below, they did express concern about execution. They felt confident
136 See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (2006).
137 Id.
138 Id. § 11001(c) ("Each committee shall include, at a minimum, representatives from each
of the following groups or organizations: elected State and local officials; law enforcement, civil
defense, firefighting, first aid, health, local environmental, hospital, and transportation personnel;
broadcast and print media; community groups; and owners and operators of facilities subject to the
requirements of this subchapter.").
139 Id. § 11001(a).
140 See Who We Are, KANAWHA PUTNAM EMERGENCY PLANNING COMM. (KPEPC), http://
www.kpepc.org/Home/Who-Are-We.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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that KPEPC has an active and diversified membership, and works diligently to
create viable emergency plans based upon the collective expertise of its members
and the information received pursuant to the statute.14 2
An EPA-funded 1999 LEPC Survey established three criteria that
characterized "compliant" LEPCs: (1) membership structure and procedures (e.g.
chairperson, emergency coordinator, and information coordinator; holding
regular meetings); (2) public communications about the availability of EPCRA
information or other types of data, and responding to requests; and (3) fully
developed or developing emergency response plans. These criteria were also
used in the 2008 LEPC Survey as a means of assessing the LEPCs' activities.143
KPEPC meets all of these criteria. It has a 15-member board of directors,
including three executive officers (Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary-Treasurer),14 4
and a 148-person membership, inclusive of the directors.14 5 The board meets
every month, and the general membership meets bimonthly.14 6 The Community
Outreach Committee is responsible for notifying the public of the availability of
EPCRA-mandated data as well as any other important public information, and for
processing requests for the information.14 7 The all-hazard plan, which many
LEPCs adopted after 9/11,148 prepares communities for a wide range of
emergencies, including natural disasters and acts of terrorism, and is regularly
updated and available to the public on KPEPC's website.149 Finally, the Drill
142 Email from Maya Nye, supra note 81; Email from Pam Nixon to author (Mar. 20, 2012).
143 Mark Starik et al., 1999 Nationwide LEPC Survey, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POL'Y &
SUSTAINABILITY MGMT., GEO. WASH. U. 10 (May 17, 2000) [hereinafter 1999 LEPC Survey],
www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/lepcsurv.pdf
144 Board of Directors, KPEPC, http://www.kpepc.org/Home/Who-Are-We/Board-of-
Directors.aspx (last visited (Apr. 16, 2013).
145 All 148 members are listed in the KPEPC Directory. See Directory, KPEPC, http://www.
kpepc.org/Home/Members/Membership-Directory.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
146 See Board of Directors: Meeting Dates, KPEPC, http://www.kpepc.org/Home/Who-Are-
We/Board-of-Directors/Meeting-Dates.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (listing monthly meeting
dates for the Board); General Membership, KPEPC, http://www.kpepc.org/Home/Members/
General-Membership.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) ("The general membership of the Kanawha
Putnam Emergency Planning Committee meets bi-monthly.").
147 Committees: Community Outreach, KPEPC, http://www.kpepc.org/Home/Who-Are-We/
Committees/CommunityOutreach.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
148 Office of Emergency Mgmt., 2008 Nationwide Survey of Local Emergency Planning
Committees (LEPCs), EPA 13 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 LEPC Survey] http://www.epa.
gov/osweroel/docs/chem/2008_1epcsurv.pdf ("Numerous LEPCs report that since 9/11, they take
an all-hazards approach to planning and no longer solely focus on chemical emergency
preparedness.").
149 See Emergency Management: All Hazard Plan, KPEPC,
http://www.kpepc.org/Emergency-Management/Basic-Plan.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013)
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Planning and Exercise Committee conducts drills of parts of the plan several
times a year.'so
Of the 2,357 known LEPCs that were contacted for the EPA's 2008 LEPC
survey, only 939 responded, consistent with response rates from the 1999
survey.'"' Though the 2008 survey did not conduct the same statistical evaluation
of LEPCs as the 1999 survey, most 2008 respondents would be considered
compliant by the 1999 criteria.152 For example, of 909 respondents, 79% reported
meeting at least on a yearly basis,'53 with 38.7% meeting on a quarterly basis.'15 4
Of 895 respondents, only 5.8% did not have an emergency plan.' Of the
respondents, 59% reported that they conduct outreach to notify the public about
the availability of their emergency plans and the chemical hazard data; however,
relatively few of them (23.6% of respondents) maintained websites to
disseminate that information, which is largely distributed by newspapers (67% of
respondents).156 The vast majority of the survey respondents (81.2% of 863
respondents) had experienced one or more chemical accidents in their service
area within the previous five years, with 32.3% having experienced six or more
accidents. ' This fact, combined with the fact that only 40% of known LEPCs
responded to the survey,' 58 suggests a positive relationship between active
LEPCs and frequency of chemical accidents.
Unlike most of the LEPCs surveyed, KPEPC receives some direct funding
from the West Virginia SERC, allocated from funds received from reporting
facilities, as well as member businesses and agencies.159 This is significant
because LEPCs are largely an unfunded mandate; indeed, the West Virginia
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, where the SERC is
administered, does not receive any federal funding to administer the LEPC
program.160 This leaves many LEPCs in constant competition for the few federal
grants available for emergency planning, and reliant on alternate resources, such
150 Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142.
151 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 4.
152 Compare id. at 17-19 (listing 2008 statistics on LEPC structure, meetings, and emergency
plans), with supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting compliance criteria in the 1999 LEPC
Survey pertaining to LEPC structure, data availability, and emergency response plans).
153 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 18.
154 Id. at 8.
155 Id. at 19.
156 Id. at 12.
157 See id. at 20 (percentages in text calculated based on these data tables).
158 Id. at 4.
159 Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142. The West Virginia Department of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management collects filing fees from facilities reporting Tier 11 data,
which is required in the state. The fees are scaled depending upon the quantity of extremely
hazardous substances stored at each facility. See 2012 Oil and Gas Fee Worksheet, W. VA. Div. OF
HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. (last updated Dec. 2, 2011) http://www.dhsem.wv.
gov/SERC/Pages/TIERllREPORTING.aspx (link to worksheet at bottom of page).
160 See Telephone Interview with Melissa Buckley, supra note 125.
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as in-kind donations from local entities.'6 1 Although much of the substantive
work performed by KPEPC is done by its volunteer membership, the committee
is able to employ part-time staff to perform essential logistical functions.162
The strength of the current organization is most likely a result of its long and
robust history, which predates EPCRA by over thirty years and covers the
numerous emergency releases that have occurred throughout the Kanawha
Valley.16 3 Indeed, the 2008 survey reveals a strong positive correlation between
higher levels of activity in LEPCs and frequency of emergencies.'6 For example,
the likelihood that surveyed LEPCs had met within the previous twelve months
directly corresponded to increased accident history.'6 5 Further, and perhaps more
interestingly, the EPA found that communities with more frequent emergencies
had a "higher level of agreement that . . . LEPC[s] ha[ve] a positive impact on
chemical safety in their communit[ies]."l 66
Despite these accomplishments, KPEPC still faces practical challenges with
implementing its plan when emergencies do happen. During the 2008 explosion
at Bayer CropScience, for example, there were failures in communication
between the emergency responders coordinated through KPEPC's Emergency
Management Plan and the emergency response team within the facility, creating
confusion as to how to direct the public and protect the responders.' 6 ' The
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) attributed much of the confusion and missteps
during the accident to Bayer's non-responsiveness and delayed safety measures
during the emergency, though it also found a few significant flaws in the KPEPC
Emergency Plan.16 8 As a result, emergency responders and residents were placed
at higher risk for toxic exposure. Both groups reported that they had been
exposed during the emergency, and many reported poor health symptoms in the
days after the incident. Among them were Davis and Willis, who have filed a
nuisance suit against the company, and Ferguson, who sued unsuccessfully for
the wrongful death of his wife, allegedly caused by the accident.169
Although KPEPC adopted necessary amendments to their Plan, as prescribed
by the CSB, the outcome of the 2008 incident raises important issues about
LEPCs' power within communities and the level of support available to them as
they create policies and protocols to protect public health and safety. Nixon, who
has been a member of KPEPC since the mid-1980s, pointed to three key
161 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 24.
162 Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142.
163 See History, supra note 67.
164 See supra notes 151-158 and accompanying text.
165 See 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 5.
166 Id. at 10.
167 See CSB REPORT, supra note 54, at 78.
168 See id. at 82.
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problems that, if resolved, could substantially improve the KPEPC-lack of
funding, the fact that much of the work is taken on by "emergency service
personnel who are already busy," and the persistent communications issues that
plague every emergency response. On this last point, however, she noted that she
was unsure "how it can ever be resolved." 70
Nixon's concerns were strongly reflected in the 2008 survey. Lack of
funding was cited by the most respondents as the single greatest obstacle to the
success of the LEPCs,17' and in an open-ended question, many responded "that
achieving good participation rates at meetings is difficult because LEPC
members are volunteers and are often busy with their other jobs or familial
commitments."l 72 Respondents also mentioned that "dedicated membership is the
greatest single factor contributing to the success of their LEPC[s]."
Additionally, 72.8% of the respondent LEPCs received no technical assistance
from the Federal government. 7 4 Of the LEPCs that did receive such assistance,
77.9% stated that it "played a significant role in guiding their LEPC activities."175
In the aggregate, these challenges seem to reflect a lack of adequate power.
That is, although Congress created these entities with the intent of reducing the
costly outcomes of industrial accidents, it delegated major responsibilities to
LEPCs with none of the real power to maximize their effectiveness.176 In the
wake of 9/11 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, there is even greater demand on
LEPCs than contemplated in 1986. Many states now rely on these entities to
implement all-hazards emergency plans, which go far beyond EPCRA's original
chemical hazards mandate to include contingencies for terrorism and natural
disasters. 77 Though many states do provide resources to LEPCs and federal
grants are available,' 78 it is clear that the current financing scheme is nonetheless
detrimental to the fulfillment of the statute.
While states have an obligation and interest in emergency planning within
their borders, the imposition of such a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme
should not place the burden of funding solely on state coffers. The 2008 survey
found that 35.9% of 868 respondents receive some form of direct funding. Of
312 responding LEPCs that receive direct funding, 54.2% obtain it through state
170 See Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142.
171 See 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 15 (noting that, of 852 respondents, 37.3%
cited funding as the single greatest obstacle to their success, followed by low membership
involvement (20.1%) and public apathy (12.9%)).
172 Id. at 8.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 14.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 24-25. The survey highlights the lack of federal financial and technical support to
LEPCs, which undermines their success.
177 See Emergency Management, KPEPC, http://www.kpepc.org/Emergency-Management.
aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013)
178 See Weeks, supra note 46, at 859-63.
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fees collected from reporting facilities, while 39.7% of LEPCs receive direct
funding from federal grants administered by agencies such as the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 179
In order to adequately provide for the unfunded and under-funded LEPCs
and to finally fulfill the purpose of the statute, Congress must create a source of
direct, non-competitive funding for all of its EPCRA mandates. The state-based
approach of levying funds from reporting facilities could be a viable model for a
federal funding program. The EPA could set reporting fees for facilities based on
the toxicity levels of their chemicals, thus creating additional incentives for
facilities to reduce storage levels of the most hazardous chemicals or to phase
them out altogether. Whatever the approach, federal and state government should
be equitable financiers of the statute.
The 2008 survey results do not explain why only a few LEPCs receive
federal technical assistance, though the statistics are clear that such assistance is
effective and has a positive impact on the operations of LEPCs. 80 As such,
federal technical assistance, along with funding, should be made readily available
to all LEPCs. Furthermore, equipping LEPCs with greater resources might create
opportunities for them to support the community in new ways, such as providing
local TRI training workshops for residents and community organizers and
launching more intensive public outreach campaigns to promote the right to
know.
Beyond these necessary resources, the success of the emergency planning
mandate is contingent upon the diligent implementation of other parts of the
statute, including TRI, emergency release notifications, and the citizen suit
provision. Information mandates are the linchpin of emergency planning; without
accurate data about the existence and extent of various risks in the community,
LEPCs cannot adequately anticipate emergencies or plan for safe evacuations,
shelter-in-place scenarios, or containment schemes, all of which are critical for
disaster mitigation. As mentioned above, the more accessible this information is
to the public, both physically and interpretively, the greater the chances that
communities will become more engaged in the planning process and responsive
to emergency drills and actual evacuations in the event of a real emergency.
Is Institute prepared for the next emergency? In a 2010 internal survey of
KPEPC members, 43% said that the there was a "medium" probability that
another industrial accident resulting in a chemical release would occur, while
40% ranked the probability as "high." 181 When asked what the likely
179 See 2008 LEPC Survey, supra note 148, at 24.
180 See id.
181 KPEPC Hazard Vulnerability Survey, KPEPC 47 (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.kpepc.org/
KPEPC/media/KPEPC/PDFS/KPEPC-Hazard-Vulnerability-Survey_201 I.pdf. The survey




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss2/3
EPCRA: A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT-TO-KNow ACT
consequences of such an accident would be, 40% responded that it would
substantially impact the health and safety of residents, and 28% predicted that it
would be life-threatening.182
KPEPC has remained committed to improving its Emergency Plan and has
incorporated many of the recommendations offered by the Chemical Safety
Board since the 2008 accident, including improving communications processes
with the local Metro 9-1-1 call center, requiring facilities to report incidents
directly to KPEPC, developing an emergency email system for residents in
affected areas, and creating a matrix of information to be disseminated to the
public during the course of an emergency.' 83 The Committee and Metro 9-1-1
also conducted a drill in Institute to practice these improvements. 184 When
KPEPC members were asked they felt about their general preparedness for
another incident, 49% responded that they felt "good" and 45% said that they felt
"fair," and 6% felt "poor." 85
C. Citizen Suits: What Does the Steel Co. Decision Mean for EPCRA 's Future?
Congress delegated power to the public to enforce EPCRA through citizen
suits.'8 6 Such provisions are found in almost all of the major environmental
statutes, with the purpose of expanding and strengthening enforcement beyond
the regulating agency.' 87 The first citizen suit provision was included in the
Clean Air Act of 1970188 in response to Congress' disillusionment with the
under-enforcement of the 1967 version of the Act.' 9 Debates abounded over this
new power, with concerns ranging from frivolous litigation and crowded dockets
to overburdened agencies and underserved communities.' 90 The result was a
compromise, a provision that empowered citizens to take enforcement actions
against non-compliant industries, but only insofar as necessary to protect the
community and the environment.
Citizen suits allow persons to sue industries that are out of compliance with
environmental statutes or to take action against the relevant enforcement agency,
of low, medium, high probability) in order to "allow participants to bring their own experiences to
the assessment." Id. at 4.
182 Id. at 47.
183 See CSB REPORT, supra note 54, at 85-87.
184 Id.
185 See KPEPC Hazard Vulnerability Survey, supra note 181, at 47.
186 EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2006).
187 See Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Suits, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LAW AND STRATEGY
321, 323 (Cary R. Perlman ed., 2009).
188 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
189 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 321.
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usually the EPA, for non-enforcement of the statute.191 To protect against
frivolous suits and financial exploitation of the provision, citizen-plaintiffs
cannot collect damages, though they may recover attorneys' fees and other costs
of litigation if they prevail in court.1 9 2 Civil penalties, which may be charged per
day for each violation, remit to the U.S. Treasury, where they may be, but are not
necessarily, used to fund environmental initiatives.' 93 These suits are now
substantial advocacy tools for individuals and environmental organizations,
allowing them to represent and defend the environment and public health of
communities that might otherwise slip through the overburdened federal
enforcement scheme.' 94 With a more direct means of achieving justice, citizens
have greater incentives to be active monitors of their industrial neighbors,
thereby expanding the nation's capacity for effective environmental enforcement.
The past 20 years, however, have seen a substantial reduction of these citizen
enforcement powers through a series of cases interpreting citizen suit provisions
of the Clean Water Act (CWA),195 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),' 96 and EPCRA. Most significantly, the 1998 Supreme Court decision in
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment'9 7 stated that citizen-plaintiffs lack
Constitutional standing to litigate wholly past violations of EPCRA.' 98 This
decision has effectively abolished citizen claims under EPCRA, as it offers
facilities a free pass to shirk reporting deadlines, so long as they submit the
required information in the sixty-day statutory waiting period before citizens are
allowed to file lawsuits. Under this enforcement scheme, citizens have little
incentive to invest in suits that are highly unlikely to hold industries financially
accountable for the untimely filing of mandated information. Stripping citizens of
this enforcement power further diminishes industry incentive to file timely
information under EPCRA, which undermines the integrity and effectiveness not
only of the information provisions, but also of the emergency planning
requirements which depend on these data. To remedy this problem, Congress
should either revise the citizen suit provision of EPCRA to expressly allow
citizen-plaintiffs to litigate wholly past violations, as it has done partially under
the Clean Air Act (discussed below), or allow citizen-plaintiffs to recover civil
penalties. Without such a revision, citizen enforcement of EPCRA will remain
defunct.
191 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 321-22.
192 See id.
193 Id.
194 See MILLER, supra note 190, at 3.
195 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
196 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006).
197 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. was intended to resolve a split in
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits over whether citizens could litigate wholly past
violations under EPCRA's citizen suit provision. At the center of this split was a
clause that is located in all environmental citizen suit provisions, requiring
citizen-plaintiffs to 1) notify violators of the nature of their violation and the
plaintiffs' intent to sue; 2) notify the State in which the violation occurred; and
notify the EPA Administrator. 199 Plaintiffs must then wait sixty days from
submitting the notification to file the suit. A violation becomes "wholly past"
when it is resolved within the sixty-day period prior to the commencement of the
citizen suit.200
In making its decision, the Court considered two previous decisions on
citizen suit provisions. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc.,20 1 the Court held that the citizen suit provision under the CWA
did not give plaintiffs standing to bring suits for wholly past violations based on
the specific present-tense language of the provision, which authorized suits
against persons alleged "to be in violation of the statute."20 2 The Court found that
this portion of the provision allowed citizen-plaintiffs to sue only so long as the
defendant had not complied with its duties by the time the suit was filed, at least
sixty days after the notice letter.2 03 Further, because the Court found that
Congress intended for citizen enforcement to merely be supplementary to the
EPA's authority, it stated that allowing these claims would undermine the
Agency's own discretion in pursuing claims against violators, and where
necessary, making settlements.204
The second case, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,205 concerned the sixty-day
notice portion of the citizen suit provision of RCRA, which the Court held to be a
non-discretionary prerequisite to bringing citizen suits against facilities on the
basis that it was meant to give the alleged violator an opportunity to remedy the
violation, thus preempting the suit itself as per Gwaltney.206 Thus, almost ten
199 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 326.
200 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1987);
see also Coplan, supra note 187, at 326 ("Courts have posited that the purpose of the notice and
waiting period is to permit the defendant to come into compliance, to allow for government agency
enforcement that would eliminate the need for a citizen suit, and to allow for settlement discussions
between the would-be plaintiff and the violator.").
201 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
202 Id. at 57-58.
203 Most environmental citizen suit provisions require that citizen-plaintiffs file a notice letter
to the relevant agency Administrator and to the violator, informing them of the specific claims.
Plaintiffs must then wait sixty days after notice before commencing litigation. See Coplan, supra
note 187, at 322.
204 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
205 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
206 Id. at 29.
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years prior to Steel Co., 2 07 the Court's general disposition on the scope of
environmental citizen suits and the issue of past violations was well understood.
The outcome of Steel Co. might have been predicted on the basis of these two
cases, if not for the unique wording of the EPCRA citizen suit provision, and the
Court's unexpected focus on the plaintiffs' constitutional standing.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits divided over how to apply Gwaltney and
Hallstrom to the EPCRA citizen suit provision, particularly because the provision
is worded differently than the CWA provision. Post-Gwaltney, Congress
amended the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to allow suits for
past violations, leaving the sixty-day notice requirement intact for both
government officials and violators.208
EPCRA's citizen suit provision, in relevant part, authorizes citizen suits
against an owner or operator of a facility "for failure. . . to complete and submit
an inventory form under section 11022 of this title . . . [and] section 11023(a) of
this title." 209 This contrasts with the present-tense wording of the CWA discussed
in Gwaltney, which allows suits against persons "alleged to be in violation" of
the relevant provisions of the statute. 2 10 Like most of the environmental citizen
suit provisions, however, EPCRA also mandates the sixty-day notice letter to the
facility, the EPA, the state, and other relevant parties.211
The Sixth Circuit, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical
Instruments,2 12 found the difference in EPCRA's language insignificant and
interpreted Congress' decision to allow suits for past violations under the CAA
while maintaining the sixty-day notice requirement as a negative inference
against allowing such suits where Congress has not explicitly allowed them.
In Steel Co., 2 13 the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion. The
citizen-plaintiffs, an environmental advocacy group, submitted a sixty-day notice
letter to a steel manufacturer for failing, since the enactment of EPCRA in 1986,
to submit the required TRI and toxic chemical release forms. 214 When the group
filed suit at the end of the sixty-day period, the manufacturer filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging that
because it filed all of the missing forms after receiving the notice, the district
207 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
208 See Krista Green, An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Resolution of the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act Citizen Suit Debate, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
387, 408 (1999).
209 See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1046(a)(l)(A)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
210 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d).
212 61 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1995).
213 Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated 523 U.S. 83
(1998), vacated 151 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 1998).
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court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit.215 The district court held that it lacked
jurisdiction under subsection 11046(c) over wholly past violations and dismissed
the case.216 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the CAA's maintenance of
the sixty-day notice requirement was evidence that the requirement was not
simply gratuitous when citizen suits are allowed for historic violations of the
statute.21 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found that as a policy matter, the
informational mandates of the statute are minimal requirements for facilities such
that "allowing citizen suits even for historical violations was permissible to
ensure compliance." 218 Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the citizen suit
provision would be made "virtually meaningless" if citizens invested resources in
pursuing violators and were then prohibited from suing.2 19
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but declined to resolve the statutory
dispute between the circuit courts. Reversing the Seventh Circuit's decision, the
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the suit based on the lack
of redressability for its claims, the third prong for constitutional standing under
Article 111.220 The opinion, which unanimously dismissed the citizen-plaintiffs'
case for lack of jurisdiction, 2 2 1 has profound implications for the citizen suit
enforcement provisions in monitoring regimes like EPCRA and the amended
CAA. Whereas a defect in statutory standing can be remedied with a few words
in a congressional revision, a defect in constitutional standing requires a
structural revision that, while technically feasible, might reignite debates on the
validity of citizen suit provisions altogether.
The alleged injury in Steel Co. was the deprivation of timely information on
which the citizen-plaintiffs relied to "learn about toxic chemical releases [and]
the use of hazardous substances in their communities, to plan emergency
preparedness in the event of accidents, and to attempt to reduce the toxic
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See id. at 1244-45.
218 See Green, supra note 208, at 422 (citing Steel Co., 90 F.3d at 1240).
219 Steel Co., 90 F.3d at 1245.
220 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 109. (1998) Although plaintiffs suing
under citizen suit provisions surpass the zone-of-interests test for prudential standing under a
statute, they must still overcome the hurdle of constitutional standing under Article Ill. Plaintiffs
must allege (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. See id. at 103; Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, (2000).
221 There was a divergence between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens about the order in
which to decide the case. Justice Scalia maintained that the Court could not move forward with the
statutory issue until it resolved whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing, and thus whether the
Court had actual jurisdiction to hear the case. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89-102. Justice Stevens
held firm that the statutory matter was also jurisdictional, and thus could have been resolved first.
See id. at 113 (Stevens, J., concurring).
409
35
Purifoy: EPCRA: A Retrospective on the Environmental Right-to-Know Act
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
chemicals in areas in which they live, work and visit." 2 22 The citizen-plaintiffs
made six claims for redress.
The first claim was for declaratory judgment that defendants violated
EPCRA. The Court quickly disposed of this claim, stating that because there was
no dispute that the defendant failed to file the reports and that the failure to file
constituted a violation of the statute, "the declaratory judgment is not only
worthless to respondent, it is seemingly worthless to all the world." 2 23
The second claim was for authorization to inspect the defendants'
facility and records. The Court dismissed this claim on grounds that it
could only provide proper redress under Article III if the group had
"alleged a continuing violation or the imminence of a future
violation."2 24
The third was for an order to require the defendants to provide plaintiffs with
copies of all of the compliance reports submitted to the EPA. The Court
dismissed this claim on the same grounds as the second claim.225
The fourth claim was for a requirement for defendants to pay civil penalties
of $25,000 per day for each violation of §§ 11022 and 11023. Perhaps most
surprisingly, the Court dismissed this claim on grounds that it could not meet the
Article III redressability requirement because the penalties are paid to the U.S.
Treasury instead of the plaintiffs themselves. 226 The court explained:
[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy that the
United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his
just deserts, or that the Nation's laws are faithfully enforced, that
psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy
because it does not redress a recognizable Article III injury.227
The fifth claim was for award of costs for plaintiffs' investigation and
prosecution of the case, including attorneys' fees and expert witness fees,
authorized by section 326(f) of EPCRA. The Court dismissed this claim because
the "plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing
suit for the cost of bringing suit." 22 8 Investigative costs were dismissed as well,
222 Id. at 104-05 (majority opinion).
223 Id. at 106.
224 Id. at 108.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 106.
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because section 326(f) only allows for compensation of the costs of litigation
itself.2 9
The final claim was for further relief as the court deems appropriate. The
Court did not address this claim.
The Steel Co. Court's rejection of civil penalties paid to the Treasury as
redress for the plaintiffs not only contradicts common sense and precedent, as
Justice Stevens asserts in his concurrence, 230 but also defies EPCRA's carefully
crafted citizen enforcement scheme. Like its predecessors in the CAA and CWA,
EPCRA's citizen suit provision was designed to expand the enforcement powers
of the statute, while disallowing damages issued directly to citizen-plaintiffs; 231
civil penalties, particularly those amounting to $25,000 per day for each violation
of the statute, are meant to compensate harm-mostly through the potential use
of civil penalties for environmental initiatives-and to deter future harm,
regardless of who receives the money. Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia's opinion,
the citizen-plaintiffs in Steel Co. were not merely acting as faithful patriots
seeking "the 'undifferentiated public interest' in faithful execution of
EPCRA;" 232 they were also seeking to deter the industry from future failures to
make timely filings of EPCRA data. Given the small likelihood of legal action by
the overburdened EPA, the Court's decision to block citizen enforcement of the
late filing penalties leaves little incentive for industries to file the information on
their own. They can avoid submitting their information until they receive a sixty-
day notice letter, and preclude a citizen suit by complying at that time.
Though Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the basis of the
statutory language, he did not find error in plaintiffs' Article III redressability,
citing private criminal prosecutions as historical precedent for similar redress 233
and assessing the consequences of denying redressability for the enforcement
scheme of the statute:
Under EPCRA, Congress gave enforcement power to state and
local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 1 1046(a)(2). Under the Court's
reasoning, however, state and local governments would not have
standing to sue for past violations, as a payment to the Treasury
would no more "redress" the injury of these governments than it
would redress respondent's injury. This would be true even if
229 Id. ("Respondent finds itself, in other words, impaled upon the horns of a dilemma: For
the expenses to be reimbursable under the statute, they must be costs of litigation; but
reimbursement of the costs of litigation cannot alone support standing.").
230 Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Thus, as far as I am aware, the Court has never
held-until today-that a plaintiff who is directly injured by a defendant lacks standing to sue
because of a lack of redressability.").
231 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 321-22.
232 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106.
233 See id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Congress explicitly granted state and local governments this
power. Such a conclusion is unprecedented.234
In addition to dampening incentives for industries to follow the law, the Steel
Co. decision penalizes citizen-enforcers. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Steel
Co., citizen-plaintiffs typically incur great expenditures in time and resources to
identify violators and to obtain enough information to make a good faith claim
under the citizen suit provision. 2 35 Adding to these expenses the attorneys' fees
and other costs of litigation places a substantial burden on plaintiffs not only to
be reasonably certain that such violations occurred, but also to recover the costs
and fees as relief after bringing an enforcement action.
Steel Co. strips away much of the citizen-plaintiffs incentive to pursue these
suits. The risks of not recovering expenses and of imposing no penalties upon
industries despite clear violations of the statute cut against pursuing claims at all.
As the EPA and other environmental agencies reduce enforcement actions due to
capacity or budget hardships, an absence of citizen suits leaves a void in the
effective implementation of the statutory mandates.23 6 In the Steel Co. opinion,
Justice Scalia stated that the citizen-plaintiffs might have achieved necessary
redress through their injunctive claims-inspections of facilities and copies of
EPA compliance reports-if they had "alleged a continuing violation or the
imminence of a future violation." 23 7 But such allegations must be predicated on
sufficient evidence and good faith belief of their existence, which may not exist
at the time of suit, even if it is likely that the facility will violate the statute
sometime in the future.238
Ultimately, Steel Co. eroded the value of citizen enforcement for both the
government and communities. Rather than reinforce Congress' decision to bolster
the EPA's enforcement powers, the Court provided industries a way out of
effective compliance with the statute, quite literally at the expense of the people
it was meant to serve.
Finally, the Steel Co. decision frustrates the purpose and scheme of the
statute. Embodied in the four central mandates of the EPCRA are two
234 Id. at 129-30.
235 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d. 1237, 1245 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated
523 U.S. 83 (1998), vacated 151 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 1998).
236 See generally James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits
at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the negative impacts of slashed enforcement
budgets and changed priorities, particularly related to national security, on the rates of
environmental enforcement actions brought by agencies like EPA and the Department of Justice).
237 Steel Co, 523 U.S. at 108.
238 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66-67
(1987). The Court held that the language of the CWA citizen suit was intended to enjoin continuous
or intermittent violations rather than wholly past violations. To maintain standing, therefore,
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overarching purposes: publishing accurate, reliable information on the presence
and release of toxic chemicals at a reasonably localized level; and using the
reported information to formulate local emergency response plans.239 The statute
clearly lays out annual deadlines for the submission of the information. 240 As
discussed above, the data are meant to be utilized far beyond the EPA, and have
transformed the ability of scientists, policymakers, community environmentalists,
businesses, and others to monitor environmental and public health hazards,
propose informed policies for reducing toxic storage and emissions, and create
emergency plans that effectively mitigate the devastation of hazardous
accidents. 241 Because the value of information is so tightly connected to its
timeliness for the purposes of the statute, communities' hazard reduction and
disaster prevention efforts will be impaired if they have difficulty obtaining
correct and current information, irrespective of any transformative measures to
streamline and democratize data access.
Though Steel Co. does not reach the question of whether the untimeliness of
information constitutes an injury-in-fact for citizen-plaintiffs under EPCRA,242
the decision that such a claim could not be redressed had the same effect as
denying the existence of the injury itself.
Further, even if the Court chose to decide the question of jurisdiction under
the statute first, thereby avoiding the question of constitutional standing, it is
clear from the concurrence written by Justice Stevens and the Court's precedent
on the subject that it would likely have dismissed the case for lack of statutory
jurisdiction as well. 243 Justice Stevens, aiming at the circuit split, scrutinizes the
language of the citizen suit provision, the sixty-day notice requirement, and the
supplemental role of citizens in the EPCRA enforcement scheme, ultimately
siding with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation.244 Although he acknowledges that
the language of the provision-"failure . . . to complete and submit" 245 -is
ambiguous, he resolves the interpretive issue with the notice requirement and
supplemental authority role,246  ignoring the implications of the CAA
amendments to the former and the "diligent prosecution" safeguard to the latter.
It is unclear, for example, why Congress could not have intended the sixty-
day notice to give owners/operators an opportunity to correct violations of the
statute so as to avoid prospective accruals of penalties, which are assessed on a
239 See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 -11023 (2006).
240 See, e.g., id. § 11023(a) (requiring facilities to submit their release reports by July I of
every year).
241 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 208.
242 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105.
243 See id. at 132-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
244 See id.
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daily basis.247 This would provide benefits to both parties by compelling the
information and preventing increased liability, while maintaining the necessary
deterrence mechanism by allowing plaintiffs to recover penalties accrued during
the period of non-compliance. Further, it has been suggested that the sixty-day
provision is intended to give government time to decide whether to prosecute on
its own, thus precluding the citizen suit, and also to allow the citizen-plaintiffs
and the violators time to reach a settlement. 24 8 Indeed, although Justice Stevens
was concerned with the intrusion of citizen-plaintiffs on the EPA's regulatory
discretion, it is unclear why the scenario he suggests-EPA negotiating a
settlement with a party and citizen-plaintiffs interfering with subsequent lawsuits
against the same party for the same issues-would not be precluded by the
"diligent prosecution" provision of the statute, which disallows citizen suits when
the EPA or possibly the state is taking its own enforcement measures against
violating parties.249 Though there may be some legal disputes between citizens
and governing entities as to what constitutes "diligent prosecution," particularly
when settlements are made to incorporate multiple claims that plaintiffs could
litigate, those conflicts could be resolved in court or by negotiation on a case-by-
case basis without depriving citizen-plaintiffs of the ability to sue for historic
violations.
The informational mandates of EPCRA are the drivers of the statute, and
emergency prevention and hazard reduction are the purpose; if the information is
not reliable and timely, then the statute is defunct. If the timeliness of the
statutorily required information can only be enforced by the agency, then many
communities are left without a viable alternative for managing non-compliant
industries, other than suing the agency for non-enforcement or spending money
and time monitoring companies and threatening them with lawsuits to force them
to file within the sixty-day notice period. A statute so heavily purposed for the
non-governmental community should not unnecessarily narrow the available
avenues for the community to obtain the information to which it is entitled.
It is important to note that that there are no records of EPCRA citizen suits
filed by plaintiffs in Institute.250 Nixon and Nye both asserted that the litigation
related to industry malfeasance, such as the cases brought by Davis, Willis, and
247 After outlining the civil penalties for violating EPCRA's reporting requirements, the
statute specifies that "[e]ach day a violation ... continues shall, for purposes of this subsection,
constitute a separate violation." EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(3) (2006). Counting each day as a
separate violation could reasonably be interpreted to decouple past infringement from the potential
for future harm.
248 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 326.
249 See id. at 329-31. Also, in this case, EPA decided not to pursue an enforcement action
against Steel Co., despite the fact that the company had failed since EPCRA's inception to adhere
to the requirements. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 87.
250 Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142; Email from Maya Nye, supra note 81. There
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Ferguson, have been common law toxic torts claims, despite the fact that Bayer
has frequently violated the statute. 251 Though there are a number of reasons why
Institute residents may have chosen not to bring suits under EPCRA-lack of
resources, no damages, strategic alternatives-the citizen suit provision is
nonetheless an important power to preserve, even if only as a means to obtain
information pertinent to developing other lawsuits.
Considering these challenges, the Steel Co. decision ultimately requires an
amendment to EPCRA's citizen suit provision that will cure the redressability
problem for past violations. The challenge, as mentioned above, is the fact that
such a change will require plaintiffs to pursue more than a nominal or
hypothetical remedy. The revisions to the CAA citizen suit provision, for
instance, are also dubious as to redressability, even though Congress intended to
confer statutory standing for wholly past violations. Allowing citizen suits under
the CAA for persistent historic violationS25 2 does not cure the Article III standing
problem, as the typical remedy-penalties to the U.S. Treasury-are no different
than those under EPCRA and most other environmental citizen suit provisions.
However, Congress' additional citizen remedy under the CAA, a Supplemental
Environmental Project (SEP) for up to $100,000 in lieu of penalties to the U.S.
Treasury,2 53 would very likely cure the redressability problem, so long as it was
aimed at the plaintiffs' community. Alternatively, Congress could always decide
to allow citizen-plaintiffs to collect at least a portion of the civil penalties
outlined under the statute. Such an amendment could be positive for communities
in need of funding for LEPCs, training workshops, and other emergency planning
initiatives. Although it cuts against the original reasoning for allocating the
penalties to the Treasury, it might be the only way to resolve the issue, presuming
that SEPs cannot all be specifically located in the violated community.
Regardless of the specific revision chosen, Congress must act to preserve citizen
suit enforcement authority under EPCRA and other environmental statutes.
CONCLUSION
EPCRA exists to balance power between communities and the industrial
facilities in and around them. That Institute and Bhopal were at the forefront of
the legislation is no coincidence; both communities suffered tremendously not
only because they were physically surrounded by volatile industries, but also
because they lacked the knowledge and political power to protect themselves
from the risks inherent in the places where they lived.
251 Email from Pam Nixon, supra note 142; Email from Maya Nye, supra note 81; see also
Interview with Warne Ferguson, supra note 43.
252 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) (Citizen suits may be brought against anyone "who is alleged
to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in
violation" of emission standards.).
253 See Coplan, supra note 187, at 323.
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Congress' decision to eschew its traditional "command and control" measures
in favor of a public information mandate shifted the center of regulatory power
from the agency to the community, giving the public access to information they
could use to strengthen public and environmental health. Indeed, as seen in the
Institute context, having such data is imperative to keeping critical issues in the
public eye after the sensationalism of a major disaster dissipates. Further,
mandating nationwide emergency preparedness that includes participation of
community members and industry representatives creates opportunities for
meaningful, collaborative relationships between parties that quite often operate in
opposition to one another.
In this sense, EPCRA is fundamentally rooted in the principles of
environmental justice: its purpose is to promote the public interest in obtaining
critical information for important decisions about where to live, play, and work,
and how to protect the health of a community. Its challenges are also rooted in
equity considerations-ensuring that citizens are able to hold industries
accountable for their actions, and highlighting the disparities in emissions and
public health outcomes in different communities, focusing particularly on
impacts in low-income communities and communities of color. New technology
and expanding knowledge enable innovative tools to improve understanding of
the impacts of industry on the health and welfare of communities and the
environment. It is imperative that the EPA and other developers of these
resources critically evaluate measures to improve their accessibility and usability
for the general public, such that the community right to know is not contingent
upon access to specific expertise, technology, or resources.
Similarly, the right to emergency preparedness should not hinge upon
whether communities can obtain financial or in-kind contributions from local
businesses and industries or compete for federal funding. Leaving this vital,
Congressionally mandated community function without the necessary basic
operational resources seems at cross-purposes with Congress' persistent
occupation with homeland security and creates inequitable outcomes for
communities with fewer resources. Congress must adequately fund the statute if
the challenges identified by Nixon and the LEPC surveys are to be resolved in
order to properly protect communities and national security.
Finally, as enforcement is imperative for the execution of all provisions of
this statute, the Steel Co. decision warrants revisions to the citizen suit language
to ensure that citizens may enforce against wholly past violations. This involves
curing the Article III standing defects, as well as addressing the statutory
jurisdiction issue raised by Justice Stevens in his concurrence. This will protect
communities by deterring abuse of the statute.
The growing body of scholarship on the linkages between environmental
hazards and public health highlights the need for policymakers to begin
allocating more resources to environmental health research and to revisit statutes
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industries impact human health. As mentioned at the beginning of this Note,
EPCRA's potential is immense: there are few laws that can contribute so much
relevant information to both academia and industry, while simultaneously
empowering citizens with tools to both resist the abuses and overindulgences of
powerful companies and plan for a range of emergencies. There is indeed a way
for all stakeholders to gain under the statute-a rare outcome in the political
arena. As such, there is no justifiable reason not to make the revisions required to
bring the statute to its full potential, and there is similarly no strong reason for its
implementation to not prioritize citizen awareness-it is after all, premised on the
public right to know. Congress has an obligation to act, and it must continuously
and consistently invest in EPCRA.
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